Monday, August 24, 2015

Below is a series of myths and facts regarding the proposed nuclear agreement with Iran.

Below is a series of myths and facts regarding the proposed nuclear agreement with Iran.
Start with Obama myth and then refute:

1.  The choice is this deal or war. The opposite is true. This deal increases the prospects of war. It immediately gives Iran up to $150 billion, which will bolster Iran’s support of terrorism and regional conflicts, requiring a vigorous armed response from neighbors. In the long run, an emboldened and strengthened Iran will seek regional hegemony—dramatically increasing the chances for broader conflict.

2. Iran won’t get a nuclear weapon. This deal does not block Iran’s path to a bomb (see Analysis: An Unacceptable Deal). Instead, the deal legitimizes Iran’s nuclear program and allows it to legally reach a nuclear weapons capability with a breakout time measured in only days.

3. The whole world backs this deal. The negotiations with Iran involved the United States and five other countries—none of Iran’s neighbors were involved. Many countries in the Middle East, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Persian Gulf countries, are deeply concerned about the impact this deal will have on Iran’s ability to fund terrorism and promote instability.

4. With no deal, Iran is free from scrutiny. As a party to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is forbidden from developing nuclear weapons and must undergo regular IAEA inspections of declared sites. With no deal, Iran is still held to inspections of declared sites and cannot pursue nuclear weapons.

5. With no deal, Iran will sprint to a bomb. If Iran turned on all 19,000 installed centrifuges, breakout time would be about two-to-three months to enrich enough uranium to weapons grade. But first, Iran would have to banish IAEA inspectors and reconfigure its centrifuges to produce highly enriched uranium. Iran knows such a breakout would risk a military strike on its nuclear infrastructure, which would grievously damage a program that took decades and billions of dollars to build.

6. With no deal, sanctions will fall apart. On the first day of the deal’s implementation nearly all financial, investment, and energy sanctions lift. With no deal, the United States continues to impact the behavior of partners, and U.S. statutory sanctions on elements of Iran’s economy continue. Access to the U.S. economy is crucial to most countries and companies, and those that choose to confront the United States on this issue could lose access.

7. “Snapback” will work. The “snapback” mechanism is problematic. It requires up to 65 days to establish and would only apply for major Iranian violations, meaning there are no consequences spelled out for more minor violations. In addition, “snapback” explicitly exempts all international contracts signed before a violation, significantly reducing its impact on Iran.

8. This deal strengthens Iran’s moderates. There is no evidence that this deal will impact Iranian foreign policy, support for terrorism or human rights. Instead, the regime will receive an economic boost of up to $150 billion and renewed oil sales, providing Iran additional resources and legitimacy to pursue its agenda. In fact, the agreement is likely to inspire the regime to expand its extreme behavior as a way to demonstrate its faithfulness to the ethos of the Islamic revolution.

9. This deal extends Iran’s breakout time. Given all that is unknown, such estimates about Iranian nuclear capabilities are speculative at best. According to the administration, Iran’s purported breakout time extends by months, not years. All meaningful restraints on Iran’s nuclear program are removed by year 15, allowing Iran to achieve thereafter a breakout time measured in days.

10. Rejection of a deal is unprecedented. Throughout U.S. history, Congress has rejected agreements negotiated by the executive branch and insisted on substantial changes. Nearly 200 treaties, including 80 multilateral accords, have been modified before they were approved.

Remember this deal with its secret side deal, allows Iran to investigate its own nuclear weapons research site at Parchin


 REJECT A BAD DEAL Throughout the Iran negotiations, the administration repeatedly asserted that “no deal is better than a bad deal,” because it understood that the consequences of a bad deal were far more dangerous than the consequences of no deal. Because this agreement fails to block Iran’s path to a bomb, it is a bad deal. Congress must reject this deal and advance a policy that creates the opportunity for a better deal.

No deal is better than a bad deal. The proposed deal does not satisfy the requirements Congress has set for a good deal in the areas of inspections, possible military dimensions, phased sanctions relief, duration, and dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. It is a bad deal that will allow Iran to legally achieve a nuclear weapons capability. No deal avoids locking in the negative consequences of a bad deal. By choosing no deal, the United States would avoid the unacceptable consequences of this deal. We would avoid legitimizing Iran’s path to a nuclear weapons capability and providing up to $150 billion within months to the leading state sponsor of terrorism—which will use funds to promote instability and undermine our regional allies. And we would avoid increasing the prospect of war, spurring a nuclear arms race, and further strengthening the Iranian regime.

     No deal opens the door to a better deal. Insisting on a better deal has historical precedent. Throughout history, Congress has successfully insisted on improvements to agreements negotiated by the executive branch. For instance, almost 200 treaties, including 80 multilateral accords, have been modified by congressional amendments, reservations or conditions before they were approved. Major arms control agreements, including the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, failed to gain initial Senate approval, but ultimately led to new negotiations and improved agreements.

If Congress rejects this deal, the United States will maintain congressionally-enacted sanctions. Other states may lift their sanctions, returning us to the situation we faced between 1996 and 2010 when America led the world by imposing unilateral sanctions on Iran. Iran will still be obligated to honor its commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). If the deal is rejected by Congress, the future of the deal will be cast in doubt. Iran may decide to withdraw from the agreement or remain in the deal without the benefits the U.S. would provide. The president will be obligated to enforce statutory U.S. sanctions that would remain in place, putting continued pressure on Iran and providing leverage to restart multilateral negotiations. It was U.S. leadership in both sanctions and diplomacy that persuaded our allies to join us in a multilateral effort targeting Iran. That leadership will be the foundation for continued economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran. The United States has the world’s largest economy and most important financial system in the world. Our sanctions have proven their global impact to dissuade foreign companies from investing in Iran when faced with the threat of isolation. Skeptics of this agreement understand why it is a bad deal, but question whether there is any alternative path to preventing Iran from attaining a nuclear weapon. In fact, there are far better options than this dangerous agreement. Congress will make America safer by rejecting this deal, continuing the pressure on Iran, and negotiating a better agreement.

READ MORE >> NEGOTIATIONS withIRAN #BadIranDeal July 2015 “No deal is better than a bad deal.” – President Barack Obama, Brookings Institution’s Saban Forum, Dec. 7, 2013; reaffirmed Dec. 5, 2014 – Secretary of State John Kerry, NBC “Meet the Press,” Nov. 10, 2013; reaffirmed Feb. 11, 2014; March 3, 2014; July 18, 2014; March 2, 2015 – Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, address at Syracuse University, March 31, 2015 – Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew, address to the U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Group, June 18, 2014 – Chief U.S. Negotiator and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Wendy Sherman, testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 29, 2014; reaffirmed July 16, 2015

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