Elder statesmen Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, both former U.S. secretaries of state, have slammed the Obama administration's framework nuclear agreement with Iran.
Writing in the Wall Street Journal, the two men accused Obama of allowing Iran to "gradually" turn "the negotiation on its head."
While Iran treated the mere fact of its willingness to negotiate as a concession, the West has felt compelled to break every deadlock with a new proposal. In the process, the Iranian program has reached a point officially described as being within two to three months of building a nuclear weapon. Under the proposed agreement, for 10 years Iran will never be further than one year from a nuclear weapon and, after a decade, will be significantly closer.
They noted further that "Iran permanently gives up none of its equipment, facilities or fissile product" and questioned the process by which an Iranian violation of the deal could be detected in time.
"The physical magnitude of the effort is daunting," they write. "Is the International Atomic Energy Agency technically, and in terms of human resources, up to so complex and vast an assignment?" implying that it is not.
In a large country with multiple facilities and ample experience in nuclear concealment, violations will be inherently difficult to detect. Devising theoretical models of inspection is one thing. Enforcing compliance, week after week, despite competing international crises and domestic distractions, is another.
From David HoroWitz of the Freedom Center
"You weren’t surprised when Barack Obama gave the green light to Iran to go ahead and develop the Bomb. We’ve been on this story from the beginning and I’m sorry to say that we’ve always had a sinking feeling about how it would turn out: with a capitulation to the sick nuclear ambitions of Iran’s mullahs that would take its place beside the appeasement of Hitler at Munich in the annals of diplomatic disasters. The Islamic revolutionaries are now free to use this “accord” to proceed with their plans to wipe out Israel just as the Nazis used Munich to proceed with their plans to wipe out Europe’s Jews. This “negotiation” not only appeases the mullahs; it enables them. "
He is a founder and current president of the think tank the David Horowitz Freedom Center, editor of FrontPage Magazine, and director of Discover the Networks,
"In fact, it looks like the very outcome you promised you’d avoid: A deal that lifts the economic pressure on an evil regime, and clears its route to the bomb. A bad deal. Far, far worse than no deal at all." David HoroVitz
WRITERS
Read more: The unfolding farce of Obama's deal with Iran | The Times of Israel http://www.timesofisrael.com/the-unfolding-farce-of-obamas-deal-with-iran/#ixzz3Wozdca1a
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The unfolding farce of Obama’s deal with Iran
The president didn’t sign a bad framework deal with the ayatollahs. He left it unsigned, open to ever more worrying interpretation
April 8, 2015, 1:18 pm 191
Time and again, President Barack Obama and his indefatigable secretary of state promised that they and their P5+1 negotiating partners would not sign a bad deal with Iran on its nuclear weapons program.
And, lo, they were as good as their word.
They didn’t sign a bad framework deal in Lausanne, Switzerland, last week. They just agreed on one in principle, and left it unsigned, allowing for multiple conflicting interpretations.
It was immediately plain that the US-led negotiators had mislaid their moral compass, and indeed any clear sight of their own self-interest, when they agreed to conduct the negotiations as scheduled even as Iran’s ruthless, arrogant leader Ali Khamenei was intoning his “Death to America” mantra, and one of his military chiefs was declaring that Israel’s destruction is “nonnegotiable.”
What is becoming increasingly plain is the extent to which the Obama team and their colleagues were played for fools by the Iranians in the talks themselves.
Iran was dragged to the negotiating table by the accumulated impact of a painstakingly constructed sanctions regime. It was allowed to leave the table with much of its nuclear weapons program intact, and with the promise of those sanctions being removed.
Unsurprisingly, Iran was not required to acknowledge its nuclear weaponization efforts to date. Unsurprisingly, it was not required to halt its missile development program. Unsurprisingly, sanctions removal was not conditioned on its abandonment of terrorism, a halt to its financing and arming of Hezbollah, Hamas and other Islamic extremist groups, or an end to its relentless incitement against Israel. Nobody who had followed the Obama administration’s abject handling of the negotiations prior to Lausanne had expected anything in these areas.
But the deal is far worse than even our relentlessly lowered expectations had given us reason to anticipate. The Arak heavy water plant is not to be dismantled. Why not? Because this was the best deal we could get. The Fordo enrichment facility, built secretly into a mountain, is not to be shuttered. Why not? Because this was the best deal we could get. Thousands of centrifuges are to be allowed to keep on spinning. Thousands more will remain intact. For heaven’s sake, why? Because this was the best deal we could get.
All this according to the — so far — undisputed elements of the unsigned agreement.
Less than a week after those sickening scenes of back-slapping in Lausanne, however, more and more of the central elements of the framework are being disputed.
Are economic sanctions to be lifted only in phases, dependent on Iranian compliance, or all at once, the moment the deal is signed? It’s not clear. Is Iran to be subject to “anywhere, anytime” inspections of all suspect sites, nuclear and military? It’s not clear. Will Iran be obligated to ship out of the country almost all of its stockpile of lower-enriched uranium? It’s not clear. Will Iran be permitted to continue its R&D on more sophisticated centrifuges, to enable a still-faster breakout to the bomb, come the day? It’s not clear.
And not only can we read the starkly conflicting accounts of what was agreed in official American and Iranian fact sheets — massive discrepancies across the negotiating table. We also have conflicting accounts from the same side of the table, with a French fact sheetadding to the confusion.
If it were not so grave it would be farcical to witness the disingenuous attempts by the Obama administration to depict the unfolding disaster as an achievement worthy of admiration — the best deal; historic; a guarantee, in the glib, empty formulation of presidential adviser Ben Rhodes, that Iran will never get the bomb.
In an NPR interview gone horribly wrong on Monday, the president did honestly admit a huge, dire, failing of the accord — the fact that, even if Iran keeps to the deal (and what a colossal, improbable “if” that is), it will be able to break out to the bomb in next-to-no-time when key provisions expire after a decade. (The president had gone part-way down the road to that admission in his New York Times interview on Saturday, saying: “I’ve been very clear that Iran will not get a nuclear weapon on my watch.” — D.H. emphasis)
But there can be no candid acknowledgement of so momentous a flaw, for that would be to confirm Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s endlessly reiterated indictment of the deal as paving Iran’s way to the bomb. And so a State Department spokeswoman was pushed out in front of the cameras on Tuesday to stammer her way through an absurd reinterpretation of Obama’s remarks, an attempt at revisionism that insults our intelligence.
It gets worse. The Iranians’ latest contention is that the deal gives them the right to start injecting gas into their most sophisticated centrifuges — the IR-8s — which they say can enrich uranium 20 times faster than their current IR-1s. And therefore, that smiling, avuncular Foreign Minister Zarif and his nuclear expert colleague Ali Akbar Salehi told Iranian MPs on Tuesday, Iran will begin working with the IR-8s on the first day that the deal goes into effect. This, according to Iran’s own news agencies.
Needless to say, that makes a mockery of the entire deal.
Doubtless there is more of this travesty to come. That’s what you get when you allow a brutal, murderous regime to smell your hesitancy, your weakness, your neglect of your own and your allies’ essential interests.
“This is our best bet by far to make sure Iran doesn’t get a nuclear weapon,” Obama asserted to The New York Times. Really, Mr. President? It doesn’t look like that from here. From here, it looks like you could have done a whole lot better.
In fact, it looks like the very outcome you promised you’d avoid: A deal that lifts the economic pressure on an evil regime, and clears its route to the bomb. A bad deal. Far, far worse than no deal at all.
Read more: The unfolding farce of Obama's deal with Iran | The Times of Israel http://www.timesofisrael.com/the-unfolding-farce-of-obamas-deal-with-iran/#ixzz3WoyCm27l
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Dr. Ephraim Kam
| Deal makes Iran stronger than ever
The understandings reached between the world powers and Iran are not the last word. The important document will be the final agreement, which is expected to be drawn up by the end of June. It looks like it will encounter difficulties, and on both sides there are important players who object to the deal. But in light of the understandings reached thus far, and both sides' attempts to render them into the final document, it's hard to assume that they will stop before it's signed.
A comparison between each side's opening position and the principles of the understanding underscores the importance of what Iran has achieved. At the start, the Americans presented a series of demands: a stop to uranium enrichment; the closure of the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordo as well as the plutonium reactor at Arak; the removal of uranium enriched at 3.5% from Iran; a stop to enriching uranium to 20% and the destruction of the stockpile enriched to that level; disclosure of Iran's military plans to develop nuclear weapons; and a demand that the talks also include Iran's ballistic missile program. The memorandum of understanding shows that the Iranians got their way on most of the issues. Enrichment will continue; no facility will be closed, although significant changes will be made to two of them; the stocks of enriched uranium will not be removed from Iran; and the country's missile program wasn't discussed. Nevertheless, Iran agreed early on to stop enriching uranium to 20% and to cut back the number of centrifuges in operation, although it was not required to stop its research and development of centrifuges.
The importance of the results of the talks is that Iran will be recognized as a country on the brink of nuclear capability. Although its nuclear program is slated to be halted for about a decade, and in some points will even regress, both the cessation and the regression are reversible should Iran decide to move ahead. It will therefore preserve its ability to produce a nuclear weapon in short order, if and when it decides to do so, in violation of the deal. Moreover, the Americans hesitated about how long it would take Iran to develop nuclear weapons through amassing enriched uranium that could be turned into fissile material to make a nuclear bomb. The assessment was that today, Iran is two months away from that breakthrough. They intend to stretch that period to a year, assuming that a year would suffice to identify the breakthrough and take steps to stop it. But in practice, it is doubtful that a year would be enough in light of the time it would take for the intelligence community to identify the development, attempt to persuade Iran to refrain from making it, and take action to stop it.
Additional difficulties: Iran demanded that the deal be limited to a few years, after which the limitations on its nuclear program would be removed and it would be allowed to do what it wants. The Americans agreed to the idea of removing the limitations, but demanded that they would expire after being in place for at least a decade. Their demand was agreed to. Iran in turn demanded that the economic sanctions currently in place be lifted as soon as the agreement is signed, but the Western governments wanted to remove them in stages, after Iran proves that it is living up to its end of the deal. It's unclear what was agreed upon.
Finally, it's unclear how oversight of Iran's nuclear program will be increased after Iran has thus far wriggled out of supplying information about the military aspects of the program -- to the point where the International Atomic Energy Agency head said he could not confirm that Iran did not have a military nuclear program. Iran has come out of the deal in a new position. The sanctions against it will be removed and governments and private companies will rush to do business with it. Its regional status will be bolstered when its involvement in neighboring countries -- Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and the Gaza Strip -- is already unprecedented. Iran becoming a state on the verge of nuclear capability could prompt other countries to follow suit. And the American administration is hoping that it will be able to cooperate with it to stabilize the region, but it's doubtful that that's what Iran has in mind. Its foremost regional goal is still to weaken the U.S. in the Middle East.
Will Iran take advantage of the loopholes in the deal to develop nuclear weapons? Its ultimate interest in acquiring nuclear weapons has not diminished, and we can assume that its attempts to do so will continue despite the agreement. The likely possibility is that Iran will not rush to reach a nuclear bomb in the next few years so as not to destroy what it gained in the deal and be punished severely. But when the restrictions are lifted about a decade from now, Iran could attempt to achieve nuclear weapons capability -- possibly at a new, secret facility -- hoping to present the world with a fait accompli.
ran Contradicts US, Plans to Use Advanced Centrifuges Immediately
It appears Iran is telegraphing its intended breaches of the agreement in advance.
Published: April 8th, 2015
Iran’s foreign minister Javad Zarif and nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi told a closed-door Iranian parliament session on Tuesday morning that as soon as the nuclear deal is in effect Iran will begin using the advanced IR-8 centrifuges, according to the Iranian FARS agency.
Iran would start by injecting UF6 gas into those latest generation centrifuges.
The US claims the P5+1 nuclear agreement with Iran requires that those centrifuges be put in storage and not used.
Iran also plans to release its own “fact sheet” detailing the Iranian narrative of the Lausanne negotiations.
Yesterday, President Obama said that the Iranians would have zero breakout time 13 years after the deal was signed. That statement assumed they don’t breach the agreement earlier, as they’ve just made clear they will.
Posted: 04 Apr 2015 10:49 AM PDT
(Scott Johnson)
Bill Kristol has posted a special Weekly Standard editorial on the framework agreement with Iran. We’ll have more to say, but Bill presents with an action item:
Experts: Iran Will be '3 Weeks from a Nuclear Weapon'
Experts tell science magazine deal will let Iran get advanced centrifuges, meaning it will be a short sprint from a nuclear bomb.Responding to the Iran nuclear deal sealed Thursday, one expert has revealed that the nuclear centrifuge research allowed by the deal likely will allow the Islamic regime to reach a point where it can make a dash for the nuclear bomb within three weeks.
The Arms Control Association think tank in Washington DC has called for inspectors to also be allowed to weigh Iran's uranium from the mine all the way to enrichment, so as to strictly make sure none is whisked away for covert development. Joe Cirincione, head of the American anti-nuclear proliferation group The Ploughshares Fund, told New Scientist that Iran currently has 8,000 kilograms of uranium enriched to the point where they can be used as nuclear fuel. The centrifuges Iran has declared would be able to further enrich that quantity into a nuclear bomb within two to three months at present, he says. But with the deal, during which Iran will be allowed to continue enriching at a reduced rate and conduct research that could let it improve its centrifuge technology, that breakout time will drop considerably. According to Cirincione, with more advanced centrifuges achieved through the deal, Iran will be able to march to the bomb in a mere three weeks. Aside from the danger of Iran getting enough nuclear material to build a bomb, the Islamic regime will also need to develop a warhead capable of containing the cataclysmic weapon. Christopher Bidwell of the Federation of American Scientists told New Scientist that concerns about Iran's suspected warhead research are not even addressed in the framework deal, although he says the law requires that topic to be addressed in order for the US to lift sanctions. "Sneak out" - worse than breakout Iran has long operated its clandestine nuclear program, with many warning that it will deceive world powers and continue developing nuclear arms power covertly. James Acton, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace located in Washington DC, gave further credence to those fears, saying that beyond nuclear breakout there is a greater threat of Iranian nuclear "sneak out." A number of countries have tried to gain nuclear power since the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, he said, but instead of using breakout by which uranium is diverted from declared facilities, many have used "clandestine enrichment plants." One example of covert success has been North Korea. Acton noted that both of Iran's enrichment plants started in exactly that manner. In order for Iran to be blocked from secretly going nuclear, Bidwell said International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors must also be allowed in to undeclared nuclear facilities. That would require Iran signing the 1997 Additional Protocol of the IAEA, allowing inspectors to visit any site at short notice, monitor non-nuclear materials used in the enrichment process, and perform environmental sampling for leaked radionuclides, he said. But back in 2006 Iran stated clearly it will not sign the protocol. What's more, Acton says the current situation may require further steps not included in the protocol, such as interviewing nuclear scientists, and monitoring all new centrifuge components. |
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